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1. Introduction
1.1  Traditional, Nodal, and Transnational 
Governance Models
Traditional models of regulation and governance draw authority from the sover-
eign power of the state and convert that authority into an action in regulation or 
in governance.1 As Morgan and Yeung outline in their classic Introduction to Law 
and Regulation (Morgan and Yeung 2007) traditional models of regulation and 
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governance begin from the cybernetics principle. Such a model begins with three 
components of a control system: capacity for standard setting; capacity for infor-
mation gathering; and capacity for behaviour modification. In essence a model 
for regulation or for governance is predicated upon a standard- setting authority, 
a monitoring system which detects deviation from these standards and a form of 
corrective action to remedy deviation. Lawyers tend to more commonly apply a 
narrow definition of regulation: ‘At their narrowest, definitions of regulation tend 
to centre on deliberate attempts by the state to influence socially valuable behav-
iour which may have adverse side- effects by establishing, monitoring and enforcing 
legal rules’ (Morgan and Yeung 2007:  3). Some, however, employ a wider defin-
ition of what some may more properly suggest is governance: ‘At its broadest regu-
lation is seen as encompassing all forms of social control, whether intentional or 
not, and whether imposed by the state or other social institutions’ (Morgan and 
Yeung 2007: 3– 4). The true nature of regulation and governance, as applied in the 
real world, is probably closer to the latter than the former, but the study of such 
an ill- defined sphere would be nigh- on impossible as almost any social action by 
any institution could be defined as a regulatory act. Thus studies of regulation and 
governance have developed a number of refinements and supplementary models. 
Many such as risk based regulation (Black 2010) and responsive regulation (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992; Baldwin and Black 2008) are modelled upon specific relation-
ships between an industry or sector and its regulator. They assume commonality of 
experience and language: in essence these approaches are institutional approaches 
to both regulation and governance. Another set of models examines the social 
structures of regulation and governance such as libertarian paternalism and empir-
ical regulation (Sunstein and Thaler 2003; Sunstein 2011), and ‘smart’ regulation 
(Gunningham and others 1998). These are valuable additions to both the normative 
cybernetic model and the risk/ responsive institutional models. They are not par-
ticularly helpful to the current analysis as their focus is on responses of the social 
actor in the regulatory matrix whereas the instant analysis is on technology and 
technological actors. Therefore, although we acknowledge the importance these 
contributions make to wider discourse on regulation and governance, and in par-
ticular their contribution by acknowledging the potential exploitation of biases and 
heuristics in human actors, we do not intend here to examine such socially medi-
ated forms of regulation.2
Some regulatory models do capture the role played by technology as an actor. 
The most relevant are applications of actor– network theory (ANT) or science and 
technology studies (STS) (Kuhn 1962; Latour 2005). ANT is often associated with 
Michel Callon and Bruno Latour and is closely linked to the work of the Centre 
de Sociologie de l’Innovation, Paris. It was not developed particularly to deal with 
computer networks (Latour 1996) but rather was designed to model the semiotic 
relationships between all actants in a network human or non- human. It can be 
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extremely difficult to model without years of study but a good and simple descrip-
tion is given by Ole Hanseth and Eric Monteiro:
When going about doing your business— driving your car or writing a document using a 
word- processor— there are a lot of things that influence how you do it. For instance, when 
driving a car, you are influenced by traffic regulations; prior driving experience and the 
car’s manoeuvring abilities, the use of a word- processor is influenced by earlier experi-
ence using it, the functionality of the word- processor and so forth. All of these factors are 
related or connected to how you act. You do not go about doing your business in a total 
vacuum but rather under the influence of a wide range of surrounding factors. The act 
you are carrying out and all of these influencing factors should be considered together. 
This is exactly what the term actor network accomplishes. An actor network, then, is the 
act linked together with all of its influencing factors (which again are linked), producing a 
network. An actor network consists of and links together both technical and non- technical 
elements. Not only the car’s motor capacity, but also your driving training, influence your 
driving. Hence, ANT talks about the heterogeneous nature of actor networks. (Hanseth 
and Monteiro 1998: 96– 97)
As can be seen this is a very attractive model for anyone working in the information 
and communications technology (ICT) field including those of us working in ICT 
regulation or governance as it helps model the role and influence of non- human 
actors in the network and arguably allows for better modelling of the response of 
human actors to attempts to regulate their activity. ANT is in itself a subset or per-
haps a development depending upon your point of view of STS. This is the rather 
broader study of the interrelationship between scientific discovery and advancement 
and external social, political, and cultural influences. This covers many fields from 
technological determinism to modernity and deliberative democracy. Much mod-
ern structuring of STS owes a debt to the work of Thomas Kuhn and in particular 
his work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn posited the thesis that 
revolutionary changes in scientific theories may be attributed to changes in under-
lying intellectual paradigms. For those of us working in the ICT field, it is not Kuhn’s 
thesis itself which is particularly appealing but the question of technological deter-
minism which also plays a vital role in STS theory and in particular the distinction 
between hard and soft determinism. Hard determinists see technology as a driving 
force in societal development. According to this view of determinism, we organize 
ourselves to meet the needs of technology and the outcome of this organization is 
beyond our control or we do not have the freedom to make a choice regarding the 
outcome (Ellul 1954). This may be seen as an influencing factor in movements such 
as cyber- collectivism or cyberpaternalism (Lessig 2006; Goldsmith and Wu 2006; 
Zittrain 2008). Soft determinists still subscribe to the fact that technology is a guid-
ing force in our evolution but would maintain that we have a chance to make deci-
sions regarding the outcomes of a situation. This is reflected in movements such as 
network communitarianism (Murray 2006). A third application of STS in the ICT 
field is of course media determinism which was famously discussed by Marshall 
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McLuhan in his 1964 book Understanding Media:  The Extensions of Man and in 
which he set out the famous phrase ‘the medium is the message’.
The application of both ANT and STS theories to ICT regulation and governance 
is an area already extremely well developed with excellent work available (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002; Gutwirth and others 2008; DeNardis 2014). Due to the already 
established nature of the literature in this area, we do not propose to apply ANT 
or STS theory in this chapter; instead, the tools to be applied in this analysis are to 
be found in nodal or decentred governance and transnational governance or regu-
lation. Nodal or decentred governance is found in the work of Clifford Shearing 
(Shearing and Wood 2003), Peter Drahos (Burris and others 2005), and Julia Black 
(2001). In essence, it is the acknowledgement that the regulatory environment has 
many more active participants than is recognized by traditional cybernetic theory. 
As Black observes:
The decentred understanding of regulation is based on slightly different diagnoses of regu-
latory failure, diagnoses which are based on, and give rise to, a changed understanding of 
the nature of society, of government, and of the relationship between them. The first aspect 
is complexity. Complexity refers both to causal complexity, and to the complexity of inter-
actions between actors in society (or systems, if one signs up to systems theory). There is a 
recognition that social problems are the result of various interacting factors, not all of which 
may be known, the nature and relevance of which changes over time, and the interaction 
between which will be only imperfectly understood. (2001: 106– 107)
The decentring analysis must also be placed within globalization and the trans-
national aspect of modern governance/ regulation. Again, Black acknowledges this:
Decentring is also used to describe changes occurring within government and adminis-
tration:  the internal fragmentation of the tasks of policy formation and implementation. 
Decentring is further used to express observations (and less so the normative goal) that 
governments are constrained in their actions, and that they are as much acted upon as they 
are actors. Decentring is thus part of the globalization debate on one hand, and of the debate 
on the developments of mezzo- levels of government (regionalism, devolution, federalism) 
on the other. (2001: 104)
The integration of decentred/ nodal governance with ANT or STS theory gives 
a strong regulatory model for the regulation of emergent digital technologies 
(Teubner 2006; Sartor 2009; Koops and others 2010). It is the foundation of the 
cyber- collectivist, or cyberpaternalist, movement that took root in East Coast 
US institutions and which has become dominant in our understanding of cyber- 
governance (Lessig 2006; Goldsmith and Wu 2006; Zittrain 2008). Central to this 
thesis is the role of code, or to widen the analysis from merely Internet- enabled 
technologies, the standards and protocols employed by digital technologies of all 
types. Cyberpaternalists believe that the guidance of the state, or an elite, achieved 
through manipulation of software code or network hardware, is necessary to pre-
vent cyberspace from becoming anarchic or simply inefficient (Lessig 2006: 120– 137; 
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Zittrain 2008: 11– 19, 101– 126). This is most famously captured by Lawrence Lessig’s 
model of regulation whereby he identified four regulatory modalities— law, social 
norms, architecture or design, and markets (Lessig 2006: 122– 123). These modali-
ties act as constraints on action or behaviour and within the plastic environment 
of the digital space where almost all aspects of the environment may be altered 
by human intervention, Lessig identifies architecture, or code, as the key modality 
(Lessig 2006: 83– 119). As Wu observed in discussing Lessig’s work:
The reason that code matters for law at all is its capability to define behavior on a mass scale. 
This capability can mean constraints on behavior, in which case code regulates. But it can 
also mean shaping behavior into legally advantageous forms. (2003: 707– 708)
Lessig identifies a shift in regulatory ability and power in this environment. The 
power and plasticity of code makes it the pre- eminent control mechanism for digi-
tal technologies as:
[C] ode or software or architecture or protocols [which] set [the] features of the [digital 
space] are selected by code writers. They constrain some behavior by making other behavior 
possible or impossible. The code embeds certain values or makes certain values impossible. 
(Lessig 2006: 125)
He identifies two competing regulatory interests. The first are the East Coast 
codemakers:
[T] he ‘code’ that Congress enacts … an endless array of statutes that say in words how to 
behave. Some statutes direct people; others direct companies; some direct bureaucrats. The 
technique is as old as government itself: using commands to control. In our country, it is a 
primarily East Coast (Washington, D.C.) activity.  (Lessig 2006: 72)
The second regulatory interest come from the West Coast codemakers, which he 
describes as ‘the code that code writers “enact”— the instructions imbedded in the 
software and hardware that make cyberspace work’ (Lessig 2006: 72). Often they 
will work in concert with traditional, or East Coast, codemakers mandating tech-
nical standards from the technical community. Sometimes they work in parallel 
with the same values driving both East Coast and West Coast code. Occasionally 
they will come into conflict and in some cases East Coast code prevails, in others 
West Coast code survives. What Lessig identified more than anything though was 
the contribution of the West Coast codemaker:  this was another example of the 
developing nodal or decentralized model of regulation, but, importantly, Lessig put 
considerable regulatory power into the hands of non- state actors.
1.2  Non- State Actors in the Technology Sectors
As digital technologies have moved from the lab to the home, and more recently 
to the world around us through mobile and wearable digital technology, non- state 
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actors have come out from Silicon Valley and the US West Coast to inhabit and 
represent almost all areas of society. In this chapter we have categorized them into 
four classifications: (1) business actors; (2) transnational multistate actors; (3) trans-
national private actors; and (4)  civil society groups. Each has a particular value 
set and unique ability to influence key regulatory designers (East Coast and West 
Coast regulators). Although none of these have the ability to directly make policy, 
law, or to develop underlying architectures of control, each actor has the ability to 
access those who do have that ability and each have a particular method or means 
of influence.
The first group, business actors, are made up of those technology companies who 
have the ability to directly influence the design or code of emergent technologies 
including actual code developers, such as Microsoft, Google, and Apple; hardware 
developers, such as Sony or LG, and media and content companies such as Fox, 
Disney, or UMG. The tools available to business actors are varied. Those who have 
direct access to software or hardware design may directly manipulate design or 
code to their advantage. Others may find that due to their intermediary role, such 
as Internet service providers (ISPs) or search engines, they become proxy regulators 
for the interests of others (Laidlaw 2015). Developers of new platforms and tech-
nologies often find themselves quickly in a dominant position, particularly if the 
technology is both disruptive and widely adopted. In the last 20 years, Google has 
developed a dominant position in a number of technology sectors, but in particular 
in search, while Apple had (but may no longer have) dominance in digital music 
distribution. Currently Spotify seems to hold the leading position in streaming 
music distribution against strong competition in the form of Apple Music, Google 
Play Music, and Amazon Prime Music, while Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon fight for 
dominance in streaming video distribution. The need for content suppliers to be on 
these dominant platforms gives these companies considerable market power, a pos-
ition that it takes competition authorities a considerable time to address, as we shall 
see in our discussion of the Microsoft dominance cases (see section 3.2).
Our second group, transnational multistate actors, reflect the global reach of 
new and emergent technologies: markets for new technologies are worldwide. As 
a result, and as predicted by Johnson and Post (1996), the ability of nation states to 
legitimately and effectively regulate emergent technologies is limited. This enhances 
the role of supranational organizations like the European Union (EU) and United 
Nations (UN). The EU is taking the lead in a number of areas of emergent technol-
ogy, in particular privacy and data privacy and in abuse of dominance and more 
widely through its Digital Agenda for Europe. UN bodies also play a key shap-
ing role. Most obviously through the World Summit on the Information Society, 
and the International Telecommunications Union Internet Policy and Governance 
Programme.3 Finally there are multilateral initiatives such as the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership which proposes common standards in a num-
ber of technology industries including ICTs, pharmaceuticals, engineering, and 
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medical devices. It is the second proposed multilateral trade treaty following on 
from the Anti- Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. These treaties are proving to be 
highly controversial with civil society groups and may be interpreted as an attempt 
to secure the dominance of current technology providers against possible emergent 
technologies.
The third group are transnational private actors. These are private regulatory 
organizations, as distinct from business actors, which have either organically devel-
oped into a regulatory role from a technical design or self- regulatory role, such as 
the Internet Architecture Board and the World Wide Web Consortium, or bodies 
created to fill a vacuum caused by the transnational nature of new and emergent 
technology such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). As with transnational multistate actors a more recent development is the 
design of multistakeholder principles. These bodies draw authority and capacity to 
regulate from a number of sources. The Internet Architecture Board and the World 
Wide Web Consortium are essentially technocracies supported by the engineers 
who develop and make use of their systems. ICANN receives formal authority from 
two memoranda of understanding with the US Department of Commerce and the 
Internet Engineering Task Force,4 a not uncontroversial position (Hunter 2003).
Finally, we must acknowledge the role of civil society groups. One aspect of 
Internet- enabled technologies is that as commerce becomes global so does activism 
and civil society. Leading civil society groups such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the Open Rights Group (ORG), have found themselves supplemented 
by a number of international multi- issue and single issue civil society groups such 
as Privacy International, GovLab, Drones Watch, Stop the Cyborgs, and many 
more. Although not able to directly develop regulation or governance, these groups 
through steady pressure can influence the development and deployment of new and 
emergent technology. Privacy International has successfully, along with other inter-
national civil society groups, influenced the EU to classify some digital surveillance 
technologies as dual- use for the purpose of exportation,5 while Stop the Cyborgs, 
through a long and vocal campaign which attracted much negative media attention 
undoubtedly contributed to Google’s eventual decision not to fully commercialize 
the explorer version Google Glass.6
Through a series of case studies this chapter examines how each of these groups 
plays a role in the development of governance for new and emergent technologies, 
demonstrating the role and contribution of non- state nodes of governance in emer-
gent digital technologies. The first case study looks at business actors, and in par-
ticular the role of Internet intermediaries (IIs) such as Google, Facebook, and key 
ISPs such as BT or Sky, in controlling access to content online. As intermediary gate-
keepers (Laidlaw 2015) they have a particular role, and some may argue commen-
surate responsibility, in allowing for the free flow of information from one part of 
the network to another. Their unique gatekeeper position has also led to them being 
identified by states as a key regulatory node targeted by them as proxy regulators. 
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The second case study examines the particular role of transnational multistate pub-
lic bodies such as the UN and the EU. Our examination of this area centres upon 
the role of the EU in competition law or antitrust. We examine the Microsoft series 
of cases which have seen some of the largest fines in corporate history levied. These 
may also be considered alongside the current EU Google investigations that include 
one on the Google Shopping marketplace and one on the Android operating sys-
tem (OS) and app store. Our third case study examines transnational standards set-
ting bodies and in particular the role of ICANN, in managing the generic top- level 
domain name space (gTLD). This is a space of considerable commercial value and 
some public interest. ICANN have over the years been required to manage a num-
ber of controversial programmes to expand access to the gTLD and we will examine 
two procedures in some detail, the .xxx space and the new top- level domain process 
(new gTLD). Finally, we will examine the role of civil society groups in this sphere 
and in particular the degree of success achieved by civil society groups in the digi-
tal privacy sphere with particular attention to the role of Digital Rights Ireland and 
other European privacy groups in the series of challenges brought in response to the 
EU Data Retention Directive (Dir. 2006/ 24/ EC).
2. Business Actors: Intermediaries 
as Proxy Regulators
2.1  Gatekeepers
IIs– ISPs, hosting providers, search engines, payment platforms, and participatory 
platforms (such as social media platforms), exercise key functions in their role as 
gatekeepers in the online environment (Laidlaw 2015). While IIs provide essential 
tools that ‘enable the Internet to drive economic, social and political development’, 
they may also ‘be misused for harmful or illegal purposes, such as the dissemination 
of security threats, fraud, infringement of intellectual property rights, or the distri-
bution of illegal content’ (OECD 2011: 3). Their role as gatekeeper made IIs clear 
targets for regulatory reform. East Coast codemakers wanted to encourage them to 
act in an editorial, self- regulatory role; to police and remove harmful content, while 
IIs wanted to remove any risk of being held liable for that same harmful content.
In the USA, this issue came to a head with the decision in Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Company 1995 WL 323710 whereby the New York Supreme 
Court ruled that IIs who assumed an editorial role with regard to customer con-
tent could be held liable as publishers, potentially making ISPs legally responsible 
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in libel or tort for the actions of their users. This effectively discouraged IIs from 
self- regulating, an outcome which went against the intention of Congress. This led 
to the passing of s. 230 of the Communications Decency Act 1996 (47 USC) which 
provides immunity for IIs operating in an editorial capacity. Unlike the controver-
sial anti- indecency provisions found in the Act that were later ruled unconstitu-
tional, s. 230 is still in force. It allows ISPs to restrict customer actions without fear 
of being found legally liable for their intervention. In Zeran v. America Online 129 
F 3d 327 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted Congress ‘enacted s.  230 to 
remove the disincentives to self- regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont deci-
sion’. Fearing this spectre of liability would deter ISPs from blocking and screening 
offensive material, Congress enacted s. 230 ‘to remove disincentives for the devel-
opment and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents 
to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material’ 
(47 USC §230(b)(4)). Thus, s. 230 was specifically passed to encourage IIs to play a 
regulatory role.
In Europe, regulators undertook a nuanced approach to IIs as gatekeeper regula-
tors. The e- Commerce Directive focused energies on notice and take down, impos-
ing liability for ISPs only with attainment of actual knowledge of illegal content 
or activity (Art. 14, Dir. 2000/ 31/ EC). This approach has been fine- tuned through 
case law where courts have struggled to find a sense of proportionality that bal-
ances the rights of Internet users with litigants. In carrying out this unenviable task, 
courts have to balance not only rights of users against other rights- holders, within 
an acceptable framework for advocates of Internet freedoms that also complies with 
international standards.
2.2  Searching for Proportionality
Searching for ‘nuance’ has led to a series of cases in the UK where the courts exam-
ined various questions relating to the passivity of IIs in content moderation:  for 
example, how involved in moderation does an II have to be before they lose their 
exemption from liability?7 What actually qualifies as ‘notice’ under Art. 14 of the 
e- Commerce Directive?8 And what is meant by the term ‘intermediary’ under the 
Directive?9 This search for nuance has had three effects. First, it has fragmented 
intermediary liability into subject- specific pockets of analysis. In copyright law, UK 
(and European) law has responded to immunity for conduits under Art. 12 of the e- 
Commerce Directive by developing Art. 8(3) of the Information Society (Dir. 2001/ 
29/ EC). This was given effect in the UK by s. 97A of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988, and is a provision specifically designed to allow injunctions against 
IIs. Meanwhile, s. 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, ss. 5 and 10 of the Defamation Act 
2013 and the Regulations for Operators of Websites, when taken together, provide 
a specific defence for the II if they can show that they did not post a defamatory 
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statement.10 Second, there has been an additional series of cases so fact sensitive that 
it is hard to draw a line of authority in order to advise actors on how to structure 
their business.11 Finally, agreements outside formal legal frameworks occur without 
the oversight and transparency that one would normally expect from traditional 
state actors. For example, agreements between the UK government and major ISPs 
allow for the restriction of access to content deemed pornographic unless a broad-
band user ‘opts in’ with their ISP to access such content. The UK government has 
stated its intention to extend this regime to sites hosting extremist content (Clark 
2014), while companies like BT have implemented wider content filtering systems 
under frameworks for of parental control, whereby new users must opt in to a var-
iety of content, ranging from obscene content, to content featuring nudity, drugs 
and alcohol, self- harm, and dating sites (BT 2015).
Since 2012, a series of orders pursuant to s. 97A of the Copyright, Designs, and 
Patents Act 1988 have been made by the English courts requiring ISPs to block or at 
least impede access to websites that offer infringing content. Since the initial cases 
of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. British Telecommunications plc [2011] EWHC 
1981 (Ch) and Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. British Telecommunications plc 
(No. 2) [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), ISPs have not opposed a single blocking order 
sought by rights- holders. They have instead limited themselves to negotiating the 
wording of orders. To date there has not been a single appeal regarding the costs of 
the applications or the costs of implementing the orders.12 All section 97A orders 
relating to copyright have been obtained by film studios, record companies or by 
the FA Premier League. The courts have also allowed for an s. 97A- style order to 
be made under s. 37 (1) of the Supreme Courts Act 1981 against a site selling mass 
quantities of trademark infringing goods.13 Injunctions issued under s.  97A (or 
s. 37(1)) pose a new set of challenges for the courts, in large part due to Art. 11 of 
the Enforcement Directive which requires that any remedies for relief be ‘effect-
ive, proportionate, and dissuasive’ and implemented in a way that does not create 
‘barriers legitimate trade’ and ‘safeguards against abuse’. The courts must take into 
account the interests of third parties, particularly those consumers and private par-
ties acting in good faith (Recital 24, Dir. 2004/ 48/ EC). Taken together, Recital 24 
and Article 3(2) of the Enforcement Directive (Dir. 2004/ 48/ EC), and the ruling 
from the European Court of Justice in L’Oréal v. eBay [2012] All ER (EC) 501 require 
that any injunctions must not only be ‘effective, proportionate, and dissuasive and 
must not create barriers to legitimate trade’, but also must have regard to safeguards 
against abuse and interests of third parties.14
2.3  Business Actors
Major benefactors of increased regulation over IIs are arguably those who offer 
legal alternatives to the now regulated copyright infringing services. This has led to 
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greater demand for legal services such as Spotify, Apple Music, Google Play Music, 
or Amazon Prime Music for accessing and/ or purchasing copyrighted music and 
Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Prime in the lucrative video market. The role of com-
merce in the governance of new and emerging technologies never has been more 
relevant. Companies like Dropbox, Spotify, and Netflix have developed their ser-
vices in response to user frustrations with the digital environment. Dropbox, a 
cloud storage company, thrived by providing a user- friendly solution to secure off- 
line access to files from multiple devices while offering a product that circumvents 
limitations in capacity found in personal computer hardware. By summer 2016, the 
music service Spotify had grown to over 100 million users and over 40 million pay-
ing subscribers15 providing a legal streaming alternative to Apple’s iTunes download 
service. The success of Spotify eventually forced market leaders in music downloads 
Apple, Google, and Amazon to begin their own streaming services in competition. 
At the same time video service Netflix boasted over 83 million members in over 190 
countries enjoying more than 125 million hours of TV shows and movies per day.16 
With growing popularity in cloud- based, legitimate, and income- generating media 
providers, it is unsurprising rights- holders continue to take steps to protect their 
intellectual property in the online environment.
Section 97A appears to be a powerful and symbolic tool in the East Coast code-
maker’s arsenal. Orders made under s. 97A provide allow rights- holders to compel 
ISPs into becoming complicit deputies in their fight, whatever that fight might be. 
Intermediary gatekeepers, discussed so eloquently by Laidlaw, now arguably have 
dual roles: the gatekeeper is not only an independent regulator, enforcing their own 
moral or corporate values (as allowed by s. 230), but is also a proxy— a mere tool 
or node in a larger regulatory matrix. In many cases the second category captures 
that most Lessigian act— seizing and deployment of non- state actors by the state to 
protect wider political or commercial interests: West Coast Code has been enrolled 
by East Coast Code.17
3. Transnational Multistate 
Actors: The EU DG Competition
3.1  Emerging Markets and Disruptive Innovation
Governments, of course, remain engaged in the digital governance debate. The very 
premise of a chapter which discusses the role of non- state actors in the governance 
of emergent digital technologies is that state actors are still the primary regulators 
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in this sphere. State actors may leverage control directly and indirectly and they play 
key roles in the private governance space through governmental advisory commit-
tees and policy committees. More directly governments through organizations such 
as the UN, the EU, or the African Union form supranational regulatory blocs. One 
area where the European Union has been particularly active in the field of new and 
emergent digital technologies is in competition abuses.
New and emergent technologies are often disruptive in nature and as such pose 
a threat to established market participants. The risk to established market par-
ticipants has been identified and discussed extensively in economics literature, 
especially by Clayton Christensen of Harvard Business School whose work The 
Innovator’s Dilemma (Christensen 1997) has become the foundational text in this 
discourse. In a contemporary attempt to modernize and give flesh to Schumpeter’s 
now dated conceptualization of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942:  81– 87), 
Christensen replaces Schumpeter’s macroeconomic concept of a collapse of cap-
italism with a microeconomic business- centred concept of disruptive innovation 
(Christensen 1997: 10– 19). While Schumpeter is looking at the outcome of disrup-
tion, Christensen is looking at the causal mechanism. Christensen notes that while 
most technological innovations are sustaining innovations ‘technologies … that 
[] improve the performance of established products, along the dimensions of per-
formance that mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued’ 
(1997: 11) disruptive technologies are quite different:
[They] result in worse product performance, at least in the near- term … they bring to a 
market a very different value proposition than had been available previously. Generally, dis-
ruptive technologies underperform established products in mainstream markets. But they 
have other features that a few fringe (and generally new) customers value. (1997: 11)
In time these technologies become mainstream as more customers are attracted 
to the benefits the new technology offers. Meanwhile the operators of established 
technologies lose out as they fail to invest in the disruptive technology for three 
reasons:
First, disruptive products are simpler and cheaper; they generally promise lower margins, 
not greater profits. Second, disruptive technologies typically are first commercialized in 
emerging or insignificant markets. And third, leading firms’ most profitable customers gen-
erally don’t want, and indeed initially can’t use, products based on disruptive technologies. 
(Christensen 1997: 12)
As a result, established firms fail and new entrants take over. We have seen this hap-
pen frequently with digital technologies. IBM and DEC, major mainframe manu-
facturers lost out to smaller and more nimble desktop computer manufacturers such 
as Dell, Wang, and Apple in the 1980s; IBM lost out again to Microsoft in the OS 
market, while more recently Internet technologists such as Google, Adobe, Netflix, 
and Spotify have disrupted a number of markets including web browsing, file stor-
age, applications software, mobile OSs, television and film, and music distribution. 
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It is unsurprising therefore that established market participants often take defen-
sive positions vis- à- vis new and emergent technologies which display disruptive 
characteristics. These defensive positions vary dependent upon the market and the 
new entrant. Often extensive patent thickets will be employed with dominant mar-
ket participants patenting all aspects of their technology as has been seen in the 
Samsung v. Apple series of cases fought globally over a number of patents includ-
ing the Apple 381  ‘bounce back’ patent and the Samsung 711  ‘music multitasking’ 
patent.18 An alternative strategy is to leverage market dominance in one technol-
ogy market to achieve control or dominance over an emergent market. This strat-
egy is employed usually when the dominant player in one market wishes to move 
into a vertically related emerging market such as Microsoft’s attempts to leverage 
dominance in the OSs market to achieve dominance in the web browser market or 
Google’s attempts to leverage dominance in web search into vertical search, online 
advertising and mobile platforms. Unsurprisingly, these attempts have drawn the 
attention of competition authorities in both the US and the EU and provide the per-
fect case study to analyse the regulatory activity of the EU directorate General for 
Competition as a multistate, supranational, public regulatory body.
3.2  Microsoft: Interoperability, Media Players,  
and Web Browsers
In the 1990s, the disruptive innovation for OS and applications software (AS) devel-
opers like Microsoft was web browsers. The risk was that anything which could be 
achieved through a personal computer could be achieved through a network com-
puter connected to a server. The fruits of the network computer concept may be 
seen today in inexpensive and lightweight notebook computers such as the Google 
Chromebook, which operate using the Chrome OS, a variant of Linux, designed to 
be used with network applications such as Google’s online office suite. For Microsoft, 
there was a dual threat: browsers could challenge their dominance in the OSs mar-
ket while online applications could undermine their dominance in office applica-
tions software. Despite this threat, as Christensen could have predicted, Microsoft 
as the incumbent in the wider OS/ AS markets was a slow adopter to web- browsing 
technology. The first commercial web browser was the Netscape or Mosaic browser 
which in January 1994 was used by 97 per cent of Internet users.19 Microsoft would 
not debut its browser, called Internet Explorer, until August 1995 by which time 
Netscape Navigator, the replacement for Mosaic, was on its way to controlling 
nearly 90 per cent of the browser market.20 Remarkably though by October 1998 
Internet Explorer would overtake Netscape Navigator to become the most popular 
web browser: in a little over three years Microsoft had gone from less than 4 per 
cent of the browser market to 49.1 per cent21 and in time Internet Explorer would go 
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on to hold nearly 97 per cent of the browser market.22 The story of how Microsoft 
achieved this is of course well known and is recorded by the findings of facts in 
United States v. Microsoft (253 F.3d 34):
In early 1995, personnel developing Internet Explorer at Microsoft contemplated charging 
Original Equipment Manufacturers and others for the product when it was released. Internet 
Explorer would have been included in a bundle of software that would have been sold as an 
add- on, or ‘frosting’, to Windows 95. Indeed, Microsoft knew by the middle of 1995, if not 
earlier, that Netscape charged customers to license Navigator, and that Netscape derived a 
significant portion of its revenue from selling browser licenses. Despite the opportunity to 
make a substantial amount of revenue from the sale of Internet Explorer, and with the know-
ledge that the dominant browser product on the market, Navigator, was being licensed at a 
price, senior executives at Microsoft decided that Microsoft needed to give its browser away 
in furtherance of the larger strategic goal of accelerating Internet Explorer’s acquisition of 
browser usage share. Consequently, Microsoft decided not to charge an increment in price 
when it included Internet Explorer in Windows for the first time, and it has continued this 
policy ever since. In addition, Microsoft has never charged for an Internet Explorer license 
when it is distributed separately from Windows. (US v. Microsoft: [137])
As District Judge Jackson notes:
over the months and years that followed the release of Internet Explorer 1.0 in July 1995, 
senior executives at Microsoft remained engrossed with maximizing Internet Explorer’s 
share of browser usage. Whenever competing priorities threatened to intervene, decision- 
makers at Microsoft reminded those reporting to them that browser usage share remained, 
as Microsoft senior vice president Paul Maritz put it, ‘job #1’. (US v. Microsoft: [138])
Applying this ethos Microsoft leveraged a 3.7 per cent market share into a 96.6 
per cent market share in six and a half years. The infamous case of United States 
v. Microsoft examined both the bundling of Internet Explorer and Windows Media 
Player in the Windows OS. The outcome of this case, which took six years to final 
disposal (Massachusetts v.  Microsoft Corp, 373 F.  3d 1199), was roundly criticized 
for not doing enough to prevent future abuses of dominance in the OS market by 
Microsoft (Chin 2005; Jenkins and Bing 2007).
It is arguable that the outcome of the United States v. Microsoft case represents 
a failure by the state to regulate one of its own citizens. However, in addition to 
the US antitrust investigation, the Commission of the EU undertook a separate 
investigation. This investigation was begun in 1993 and related to the licensing of 
Windows OS, access to Windows OS application program interfaces (APIs) and 
the bundling of Windows Media Player (WMP). The initial investigation in Europe 
did not involve Internet Explorer but a later investigation did involve Internet 
Explorer bundling. The initial case was brought in 1998 and was an investigation 
of two breaches of Art. 82 of the EC Treaty (now Art. 102 TFEU), and Art. 54 of the 
EEA Agreement: (1) refusing to supply interoperability information and allow its 
use for the purpose of developing and distributing work group server OS products 
(the interoperability investigation); and (2) making the availability of the Windows 
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Client PC OS conditional on the simultaneous acquisition of WMP from May 1999 
until the date of this decision (the bundling investigation).23 The case is, of course, 
extremely well known. Following a five- year investigation, the Commission found 
that Microsoft had a dominant position in both the group server OS market and the 
PC OS market. They further found Microsoft had abused both market dominances 
to leverage control into related markets, eventually fining Microsoft over €497 mil-
lion although over time this fine has increased considerably due to Microsoft failing 
to comply in good time, with an additional fine of €899 million (reduced on appeal 
to €860 million) added in 2008.24 With a clear, and for Microsoft costly, precedent 
set that, for the purposes of former Art. 82 of the EC Treaty bundling was unlawful 
the Commission opened up the entire market for software which operated on the 
Windows platform. When soon after the Commission announced that it was turn-
ing its attention to Internet Explorer bundling Microsoft immediately took action 
to ensure that it complied with EU competition law by offering an ‘E’ version of 
Windows 7 which would unbundle Internet Explorer for distribution within the EU 
(Heiner 2009), although in 2013 Microsoft were fined an additional €561 million for 
failure to implement correctly and in good time the settlement agreed to in 2009.25
The actions of the European Commission have generally been viewed as being 
much more successful than the intervention of the US federal government into 
Microsoft’s activities. While the US antitrust case is viewed as being less effective in 
regulating Microsoft’s leverage of its dominant position in the OS market, the col-
lected EU competition actions are seen as effective interventions into especially the 
emergent streaming video and browser markets. Market share data seems to dem-
onstrate that given a free choice the consumer chose not be tied to the Microsoft 
product. The global market share for Internet Explorer has fallen from nearly 97 
per cent in April 2002 to 9.5 per cent today. In addition the market is much more 
open with no browser holding a clearly dominant position, the market leader 
Google Chrome holds 58.1 per cent, Apple Safari 12.7 per cent, Firefox 12.4 per 
cent, Internet Explorer/ Edge 9.5 per cent and Opera 2.8 per cent.26 While much of 
this change in market share can be tracked to the emergence of new browsing tech-
nologies such as smartphones and tablets which make extensive use of Google and 
Apple OSs (and hence a pre- eminence for Chrome and Safari on these products), 
there is no doubt the actions of the EU Commission helped create an environment 
where new (and existing) technologies such as Chrome and Safari could develop 
their product in the PC market before phone and tablet versions were developed. 
Accurate figures for just desktop market share are harder to find but online site 
‘Net Market Share’ suggests that Internet Explorer/ Edge holds a stronger position 
in the desktop browser market, with Chrome being the dominant browser on 43.4 
per cent of desktops, Internet Explorer/ Edge on 26.1 per cent, Firefox on 5.4 per 
cent, Safari on 3.3 per cent and Opera on 1 per cent. Internet Explorer’s greater 
desktop application seems to be a legacy issue with Internet Explorer 8, still being 
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used by 4.2 per cent of users (almost the same as Safari and Opera combined). 
This was the version released in 2009 which was bundled with Windows 7 outside 
the EU, and which according to the Commission was bundled to 15 million EU 
citizens in error.27 There is little doubt that the browser market is much healthier 
today than in 2009. Equally data shows that the market for streaming video players 
is much healthier post the intervention of the Commission.28 The Commission’s 
interactions with Microsoft may have been critiqued by some free market thinkers 
(Ahlborn and Evans 2009; Economides and Lianos 2009) but there seems little 
doubt that by cutting back the leveraged vertical dominance of Microsoft they have 
allowed new entrants and new technologies to flourish in what may not be sexy but 
are important everyday markets.
4. Transnational Standards  
and Private Actors: ICANN
4.1  ICANN
When one thinks of a transnational private actor in the digital environment, one 
invariably thinks of ICANN. ICANN is a high- profile private regulator with glo-
bal reach. It was formed in 1998 to take over management of the root domain 
name space which meant ICANN became responsible for the allocation of Internet 
Protocol (IP) address spaces to regional registrars and for the management of gen-
eric top- level domains (gTLDs) such as .com, .net and .org. This was all achieved 
by the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the US government which 
transferred to ICANN the so- called IANA function of assigning Internet address 
blocks previously under the management of the Information Sciences Institute at 
the University of Southern California (Mueller 1999). ICANN was the conscious 
creation of a private multistakeholder regulator to replace the old system of public/ 
private governance (NTIA 1998). In the years since ICANN’s creation, it has grown 
to be an effective, although controversial, multistakeholder regulator. Despite initial 
criticism that it was unrepresentative (Mueller 1999; Froomkin 2001) and lacked 
legitimacy (Froomkin 2000), ICANN has withstood a number of challenges, includ-
ing a sustained challenge to its role at the 2005 WSIS summit in Tunis (Pickard 
2007), and today despite ongoing challenges seems to be secure in its role as the 
established global regulator not only of the IANA function and the root domain 
name system (DNS), but of domain name policy more generally (Take 2012).
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4.2  Generic gTLDs and the .xxx Controversy
One policy area continually debated by ICANN and stakeholders is the creation of 
New gTLDs. These are thought to be necessary due to a paucity of available address-
ing options in the domain name structure. The limited number of gTLDs (in 1998 
when ICANN was formed there were only three open gTLds .com, .org and.net) 
meant that once someone had registered say apple.com it was unavailable for any-
one else. This meant once Apple, Inc. had registered this address it was no longer 
available for Apple Records or Apple Bank (Murray 1998). The scarcity of available 
domain name space meant the push for a greater number of gTLDs to alleviate 
pressure on the ever expanding use of the DNS is older than ICANN. In 1997, the 
International Ad- Hoc Committee (part of IANA the forerunner to ICANN) pro-
posed seven New gTLDs including .firm, .store and .web as ‘the DNS was lacking 
when it comes to representing the full scope of the organizations and individu-
als on the internet’ (Gibbs 1997). These proposals were abandoned when ICANN 
took over management of the DNS but in November 2000, following a short public 
consultation, it announced seven New gTLDs of its own:  .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, 
.museum, .name and .pro. They were quickly criticized for being, with the exception 
of .biz, too narrow in reach (Levine 2005; Nicholls 2013) and ten years later an ana-
lysis of the .biz gTLD found it too had failed to meet its policy objectives (Halvorson 
and others 2012). Despite this, ICANN continued to introduce a drip of gTLDs 
including six more between 2004 and 2007 and another in 2012. During this time, 
the major controversy was over the .xxx proposal. This was a proposal for an adult 
space on the Internet delineated by a .xxx gTLD, proposed by ICM Registry in 2004. 
Initially, ICANN approved the application but in the aftermath of this decision 
national governments became engaged through ICANN’s Government Advisory 
Committee (GAC), an advisory committee formed of representatives of all UN 
member states and a number of supranational organizations including the African 
Union and the European Commission, supplemented by a number of observers 
from multinational organizations including the European Broadcasting Union and 
the International Telecommunications Union.
Initially, it appeared members of the GAC had no objections to the .xxx proposal. 
A letter from GAC chair Mohamed Sharil Tarmizi in April 2005 had stated ‘[n] o 
GAC members have expressed specific reservations or comments in the GAC, about 
the applications for sTLDs in the current round’.29 This quickly changed, though. 
Under pressure from groups like the Family Research Council and Focus on the 
Family, the US government hardened its stance against .xxx. This was quickly fol-
lowed by objections from Australia, the UK, Brazil, Canada, Sweden, the European 
Commission, and many others. As a result, in May 2006 ICANN withdrew its 
approval. There are many ways to view this. It can be seen as a success for the multi-
stakeholder model in that an initial decision of the ICANN Board taken following 
limited consultation was reversed following action from civil society groups and 
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discourse by representatives of democratic governance in the GAC. In the alterna-
tive, it could be viewed as a failure by ICANN to represent the wider community 
and the variety of stakeholders with an interest in liberalization of the gTLD space. 
In the first major challenge to the ICANN multistakeholder model, national gov-
ernments had flexed their muscles and had won the day. As Jonathan Weinberg 
states: ‘National governments had become involved with the issue late in the day, but 
their objections were powerful … empowered by that experience, GAC members 
sought to make their views known more broadly’ (Weinberg 2011: 203); certainly 
there was a prevailing view that ICANN had allowed themselves to be dominated 
by the GAC in this exchange (Berkman Centre 2010; Mueller 2010: 71– 73; Weinberg 
2011). Perhaps fortuitously, ICANN had previously agreed to arbitration should 
there be any challenges to their decisions and ICM took advantage of this to chal-
lenge the decision. The eventual decision of the International Center for Dispute 
Resolution in February 2010 found that ICANN had been wrong to reverse their 
decision (ICM v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08, 19 February 2010). They 
found that ICANN had a duty to ‘operate for the benefit of the Internet community 
as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of inter-
national law and applicable international conventions and local law’, that ‘the Board 
of ICANN in adopting its resolutions of June 1, 2005, found that the application of 
ICM Registry for the .XXX sTLD met the required sponsorship criteria’ and vitally 
that ‘the Board’s reconsideration of that finding was not consistent with the applica-
tion of neutral, objective, and fair documented policy’ (ICM v. ICANN: [152]). They 
also tacitly supported ICM’s contention that ‘[ICANN] rejected ICM’s application 
on grounds that were not applied neutrally and objectively, which were suggest-
ive of a pretextual basis to ‘cover’ the real reason for rejecting .XXX, i.e., that the 
U.S. government and several other powerful governments objected to its proposed 
content’ (ICM v. ICANN: [89]). As a result of this, ICANN reviewed the decision, 
and in March 2011 ICANN approved the .xxx domain.
4.3  The New gTLD Process
The fallout from the .xxx case was felt acutely in the next stage of domain name 
liberalization, the creation of ‘New gTLDs’ a process formally begun in 2008. It 
reached fruition in 2011 when the ICANN Board agreed to allow applications for 
New gTLDs from any interested party upon payment of a substantial management 
fee.30 To date, over 500 New gTLDs have been approved,31 and they fall mostly into 
four categories:  trademarks such as .cartier, .toshiba, and .barclays; geographical 
such as .vegas, .london, and .sydney; vocational such as .pharmacy, .realtor, and 
.attorney and speculative such as. beer, .porn, and .poker.32 Learning from their 
experience in the .xxx controversy, ICANN approached the New gTLD process 
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differently. First, an attempt by some members of the GAC to regain control over 
the approval process was met head on. An attempt by the Obama administration to 
secure for the US and other GAC members a veto right against New gTLD applica-
tions (McCullagh 2011) was deflected by ICANN who refused to act on the pro-
posal. Instead, ICANN reaffirmed the process which had been previously agreed; 
a proposal which ultimately met with agreement of most members of the GAC.33 
To meet both the concerns of allowing an open registration process, which allows 
any string of letters or characters to be registered, and the .xxx concern, the New 
gTLD registration process has two safeguards. The first is that once an application 
is made there is a period during which objections against grant may be lodged on 
one of four grounds: string confusion (where the applied for name is confusingly 
similar to an already in use or applied for string, such as .bom or .cam); legal rights 
objections (where the name is confusingly similar to a legal trademark or right in 
a name, such as .coach or .merck); community objections (where a challenge may 
be brought by representatives of a community to whom the name is impliedly or 
implicitly addressed, such as .amazon or .patagonia); and finally and vitally for our 
analysis a limited public interest challenge which may be brought where the gTLD 
string is contrary to generally accepted legal norms of morality and public order 
that are recognized under principles of international law. Each objection gives rise 
to an arbitration process with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre dealing 
with legal rights objections; the International Center for Dispute Resolution deal-
ing with string confusion objections and the International Center of Expertise of 
the International Chamber of Commerce dealing with both community and public 
interest challenges. New gTLDs cannot be awarded until they have either passed 
the period for objection without any objection being lodged or the applicant has 
been successful at arbitration. Any interested party with standing, including GAC 
members, can bring challenges. As with the .xxx case, arbitration was seen as the 
best way to settle disputes, and as with the longstanding dispute resolution pro-
cedure, independent arbiters are preferred. The second safeguard was the creation 
and appointment of an ‘Independent Objector’. This was an office created solely to 
serve the best interests of global Internet users. The Independent Objector could 
lodge objections in cases where no other objection has been filed but only on lim-
ited public interest and community grounds. The appointed Objector was Professor 
Alain Pellett and he lodged 23 such objections ranging from .amazon to .health. He 
prevailed in five claims, lost in 14 and four claims were withdrawn.
The New gTLD process is clearly a refinement of the processes used in previous 
rounds of gTLD creation. There have been a number of critiques of ICANN that 
have drawn into question its legitimacy. Many of these have focused upon its pro-
cesses for renewing and reforming the DNS. Claims made by critics include that 
ICANN, despite being set up as a multistakeholder regulator, has been too narrow 
in approach, unresponsive to criticism and undemocratic in action (Mueller 1999; 
Froomkin 2000; Froomkin 2001; Koppell 2005; Pickard 2007). Fears about undue 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 25 2017, NEWGEN
oxfordhb-9780199680832_Part-4.indd   688 4/25/2017   6:59:54 PM
governance of new and emerging digital technologies   689
influence of GAC members remain to this day (Mueller and Kuerbis 2014), but the 
New gTLD process, although not without flaws (Froomkin 2013), is clearly more 
inclusive of the wider Internet community and stakeholders outside of the usual 
closed group of ICANN board members, GAC members, and trademark hold-
ers. Objections have come from diverse interest groups such as the International 
Lesbian Gay Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association and the Union of Orthodox 
Jewish Congregations of Americas, member associations such as the Universal 
Postal Union and the International Union of Architects, political associations 
including the Republican National Committee and local interest groups including 
the Hong Kong Committee on Children’s Rights. All these challenges are in add-
ition to the challenges brought by the Independent Objector and the large number 
of challenges brought by commercial entities as well as the limited number brought 
by national governments and public authorities. As noted at the outset of this sec-
tion, the importance and value of domain names as a tool for identity as well as 
addressing mean they play a vital role in emergent online offerings. All too often, 
we think of new and emergent technologies in terms of hardware or innovative ser-
vices. The development of the DNS from 1998 onwards has been a vital component 
of the development of the Web and mobile content and ICANN have played a vital 
role in this. The importance and value of the DNS is exactly why they are such a 
controversial regulator. Much improvement is still clearly required of them but the 
New gLTD process is arguably a move in the right direction.
5. Civil Society Groups:  
| Data Retention
5.1  Data Retention, Proportionality, and Civil Society
The EU Data Retention Directive (Dir. 2006/ 24/ EC) sought to harmonize EU 
Member States’ provisions ‘concerning the obligations of the providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications net-
works’ with regard to data retention for the purpose of the investigation, detection 
and prosecution of serious crime (Data Retention Directive. Art. 1 (1)). Under Art. 
10 of the Directive, Member States are required to provide statistics relating to the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of pub-
licly available electronic communications services or a public communications net-
work. These statistics include: the cases in which information was provided to the 
competent authorities in accordance with applicable national law; the time elapsed 
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between the date on which the data were retained and the date on which the compe-
tent authority requested the transmission of the data; and the cases where requests 
for data could not be met.34
Given the rapid advance in technology, concerns for what amounted to suffi-
cient legal safeguards remained unclear. After an advocacy group called Access 
to Information Program (AIP) initiated an action, the Bulgarian Supreme 
Administrative Court (SAC) annulled Art. 5 of the Bulgarian Regulation No. 40 
which provided for a ‘passive access through a computer terminal’ by the Ministry 
of Interior, as well as access without court permission by security services and other 
law enforcement bodies, to all retained data by Internet and mobile communication 
providers. The SAC annulled the article, considering that the provision did not set 
any limitations with regard to the data access by a computer terminal and did not 
provide for any guarantees for the protection of the right to privacy stipulated by 
Art. 32(1) of the Bulgarian Constitution. In Romania a challenge to Law 298/ 2008, 
the Romanian implementing provision, found that
[T] he provisions of Law no. 298/ 2008 regarding the retention of the data generated or pro-
cessed by the public electronic communications service providers or public network provid-
ers, as well as the modification of law 506/ 2004 regarding the personal data processing and 
protection of private life in the field of electronic communication area are not constitutional.35
After over 30,000 German citizens brought a class action suit, Germany’s high-
est court suspended its implementation of the Directive by ruling that it violated 
citizens’ rights to privacy.36 Finally, a constitutional challenge was raised in the 
Irish courts, brought by another advocacy group, Digital Rights Ireland, challeng-
ing the entire European legal basis for data retention (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd 
v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (C- 293/ 12) [2014] All 
ER (EC) 775).
The EU responded with data retention reform plans to reduce and harmon-
ize the data retention period: It noted ‘[a] pproximately, 67% of data is requested 
within three months and 89% within six months’ (EU Commission 2013:  7). 
Additionally, there was an increase in the types and scope of data to be retained, 
minimum standards for access and use of data, stronger data protection, and a 
consistent approach to reimbursing operators’ costs.37 Meanwhile, the Irish gov-
ernment attempted to discontinue the Irish action by seeking security for costs 
requiring payment into court to cover the costs of the state should they lose. 
Because of the high cost of High Court actions requiring such a payment at the 
outset could have effectively prevented the case from being heard. The Court 
rejected the state’s application:
[G] iven the rapid advance of current technology it is of great importance to define the legit-
imate legal limits of modern surveillance techniques used by governments … without suffi-
cient legal safeguards the potential for abuse and unwarranted invasion of privacy is obvious 
… That is not to say that this is the case here, but the potential is in my opinion so great that 
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a greater scrutiny of the proposed legislation is certainly merited. (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd 
v. Minister for Communication & Ors [2010] IEHC 221: [108])
5.2  Transparency and Civil Society
In the fallout from the Snowden revelations, regulation of intelligence and sur-
veillance agencies is slowly being increased, albeit not necessarily at the pace that 
privacy advocates would like. A right to privacy may not yet have the same bite as 
normally associated with other fundamental rights, but pressure to respond to civil 
society’s bark has played an increasingly important role in checking the abuse of 
runaway state power (United Nations 2013, United Nations 2014). There have been 
a number of legal challenges at the European Court of Human Rights by civil soci-
ety groups ranging from surveillance challenges to demands to the release docu-
ments detailing the spying agreements between the ‘Five Eyes’ partners (Big Brother 
Watch & Or. v. UK ECtHR App. 58170/ 13; Bernh Larson Holdings v. Norway, ECtHR 
App. 24117/ 08; Liberty & Ors v. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs & Ors [2015] 1 Cr App R 24). At the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) civil society have successfully challenged the legal regime governing data 
retention (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources (C- 293/ 12) [2014] All ER (EC) 775) and, as seen have had con-
siderable influence over domestic, implementing, legislation. The ORG along other 
European societies has led domestic campaigns forcing governments to rethink their 
approaches to domestic surveillance or programmes that do not embrace or under-
stand how they may compromise fundamental rights. The German Constitutional 
Court partially upheld a complaint that the police authorities’ audio surveillance of 
a home (a large- scale eavesdropping attack) breached fundamental rights; finding 
that any breach of a constitutional right on the basis of IT security requires factual 
evidence indicating a specific threat to an outstanding and overriding legal interest 
and judicial authorization.38
Civil society has also played a role in moderating legitimate actions by the state 
to regulate content. In 2014, the British government demanded that ISPs and mobile 
phone companies made a change in their choice architecture to restrict access to 
adult content. Access to content that is pornographic would be blocked unless a 
broadband user ‘opts in’ with its provider to access such sites. Major ISPs imple-
mented a filtering programme, marketing the programme as ‘parental controls’, 
whereby users must opt- in to a variety of content, ranging from obscene content, to 
content featuring nudity, drugs and alcohol, self- harm, and dating sites. However, 
blocking systems tend not to work quite as well as was intended; filters designed to 
stop pornography also block sex education, sexual health, and advice sites. Parental 
reliance on blocking can result in derogation of parental responsibility. Overreliance 
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on a web- filtering programme often assumes that nothing is going to get through 
resulting in the misguided assumption by a parent that their child is safe. Civil 
society engaged in petitions to moderate the government’s stance and to help ISPs 
engage with users who may be affected by their decision to change the default rule. 
Groups like 451 Unavailable and Blocked.org.uk have helped to highlight the prob-
lem of web blocking, and have encouraged courts to publish blocking orders to 
increase transparency. As a result of this type of advocacy, the UK courts adopted 
ORG’s recommendations that any blocking orders should be required to have safe-
guards against abuse, and as a consequence adopted ORG’s proposals about landing 
pages and ‘sunset clauses’ as safeguards against abuse.
6. Conclusions
This chapter elucidates roles and relationships of non- state actors in governance 
of the online environment. In doing so, it examines reasons for that role and dis-
cusses the utility and legitimacy of the relationship with traditional Westphalian 
forms of governance. The chapter also pays some attention to the equivalent role 
of law, charting its interaction with non- state actors. Its basic premise is that non- 
state actors play such a key part in regulation of cyberspace that the latter cannot 
be properly understood without explaining the frameworks in which they reside. 
At the same time, we have attempted to contribute to the legal and regulatory dis-
cussion about the legitimacy of regulatory roles non- state actors play. Accordingly, 
there is increasing awareness of the power embedded within non- state actors and 
the need for ongoing assessment of the balance of power between private and public 
bodies generally.
On another level the chapter also seeks to address the non- state actor’s role in 
‘meta- regulation’— their coordination in networks with markets and governments. 
The extent of the role of the non- state actors attracts critical analysis; accordingly, 
there is growing awareness that the regulatory regimes for Internet regulation have 
an inherent complexity that is difficult to comprehend. This poses significant chal-
lenges for regulators and engenders legal uncertainty, but also creates opportuni-
ties for abuses of power by non- state actors. For Teubner, privatized rulemaking 
continues to exert ‘massive and unfiltered influence of private interests in law mak-
ing’, and is characterized as ‘structural corruption’ (Teubner 2004: 3, 21). For others 
private ordering remains the most legitimate and effective means of regulating the 
online environment (Easterbrook 1996; Johnson and Post 1996: 1390– 1391). The role 
of the non- state actor will continue for the foreseeable future to remain the subject 
of critique.
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The ascendency of non- state actors is a hallmark of the online environment. The 
largesse of the non- state actor’s conquest is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated 
by its invasion of cyberspace. Legal scholars will continue to examine the relation-
ships prevalent in cyberspace, not only relationships between private corporations, 
but also relationships that govern relationships between government agencies and 
non- state actors. These apply particularly to relationships between private sector 
actors (in the form of business- to- business or business- to- consumers relationships, 
and secondarily, to relationships between private actors and government bodies (in 
the form of business- to- government). Taken together they help to embed the emer-
gence of recent macro- regulatory terms like ‘nodal governance’, ‘Internet govern-
ance’ and ‘transnational private regulation’ (Braithwaite 2008; Abbott and Sindal 
2009; Calliess and Zumbansen 2010; Cafaggi 2011).
As we have attempted to show, ICANN is an illustration par excellence of the 
complexity and dynamics of a transnational private regulator. The organization 
of ICANN is also intricate and difficult to decipher (Bygrave and Michaelsen 
2009: 106– 110). This reflects the cornucopia of stakeholders that make up ICANN’s 
raison d’être and its commitment to policymaking through broad consensus. An 
enduring criticism of ICANN is the lack of appeal processes to another body with 
the power to overturn them. Although a policy proposal may emerge with broad 
agreement from the constituencies concerned, it is the ICANN Board’s decision 
alone to adopt or reject the proposal.39 Although several mechanisms exist for 
reviewing Board decisions, none of these create legally binding outcomes (Weber 
and Gunnarson 2013: 11– 12). Non- commercial user constituencies at ICANN exist 
solely to curb the influence of those stakeholders at ICANN that maintain consider-
able economic and political clout. Their function is to carve out a space for individ-
ual rights and individual registrants against excessive claims by rights- owners and 
governments. For example, the Non- commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) spent 
seven weeks in negotiations with other stakeholder groups to try to balance the 
rights of intellectual property owners with those of new and small businesses, other 
non- commercial entities, various users, and the registry/ registrar communities.
The NCSG is only one example of civil society’s role in ‘checking’ more trad-
itional power structures. Civil society is no longer just a term used to aggregate 
non- governmental and non- commercial entities together. Groups like Privacy 
International, the ORG, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation exist to ensure 
accountability exists on two levels: organizational accountability to the stated pur-
pose and function of the actor and procedural accountability to the behaviour and 
actions of internal management. Arguably, the increased role of civil society has 
come about in response to an increasing number of legal agreements falling under 
the ‘soft law’ umbrella, away from traditional statutory instruments. As a result, there 
is an inherent difficulty in establishing clear legal lines as to what legal instrument 
regulates what actor in the online environment. Soft law measures have incredible 
influence in changing established revenue streams (consider our earlier discussion 
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on the financial consequences for a site blocked by an S97A order) or basic human 
rights (consider legislation on data privacy). The fluidity of political constellations 
can also force a change to the way civil society interacts with other actors in the 
online environment (for example, the replacement of the Joint Project Agreement 
between the US government and ICANN by the Affirmation of Commitments).
Sometimes civil society will be instrumental in pushing back against ‘soft law’ 
measures deployed by and over non- state actors. Sometimes soft law helps to shape 
the continuing nuances of online communication. While the Internet is said by 
some to be the great facilitator of freedom of expression, governments are constantly 
seeking to limit this right in line with the demands of their citizens; for example, 
passing measures to combat Internet facilitated crime unique to the modern era like 
cyberbullying, trolling, and revenge porn. However, we find ourselves concluding 
that whenever regulators needed ‘hard law’ to exercise fine- grained control tailored 
to the needs of a particular platform, service, or online community, contract law 
is most often deployed. Statutory forms of control over non- state actors remains 
largely an option of ‘last resort’, used mostly in an indirect fashion and designed to 
leverage control through the structural features of either the network or the market. 
This is seen in our study through the activities of the EU Directorate- General for 
Competition in regulating the market for media players and Internet browsers, and 
represented currently by the DG- COMP investigations into Google. Such interven-
tions remain rare and given their complexity and costs are only exercised where 
all other solutions have run out. Non- state, decentred, and intermediary control 
are likely to remain at the heart of online regulation and governance for some time 
to come.
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